Is There Ever A Reason to Know? A Comparison of the Contributory Liability  Knowledge  Standard for Websites Hosting Infringed Trademarked Content Versus Infringed Copyrighted Content by Agress, Rachel N.
The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law
Volume 5 | Issue 1 Article 7
11-15-2011
Is There Ever A Reason to Know? A Comparison of
the Contributory Liability "Knowledge" Standard
for Websites Hosting Infringed Trademarked
Content Versus Infringed Copyrighted Content
Rachel N. Agress
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel
Part of the Intellectual Property Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rachel N. Agress, Is There Ever A Reason to Know? A Comparison of the Contributory Liability "Knowledge" Standard for Websites Hosting
Infringed Trademarked Content Versus Infringed Copyrighted Content, 5 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. Iss. 1 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jbel/vol5/iss1/7
  
IS THERE EVER A REASON TO KNOW? 
A COMPARISON OF THE CONTRIBUTORY 
LIABILITY “KNOWLEDGE” STANDARD 
FOR WEBSITES HOSTING INFRINGED 
TRADEMARKED CONTENT VERSUS 
INFRINGED COPYRIGHTED CONTENT  
RACHEL N. AGRESS* 
Abstract ................................................................................................................. 180 
I.  Introduction ...................................................................................................... 180 
II.  The Origins of Contributory Infringement ...................................................... 181 
A.  The Lanham Act—Trademark Infringement ....................................... 181 
B.  The Copyright Act—Copyright Infringement ..................................... 181 
C.  Basic Tort Law and Contributory Infringement: Imputed Intent ......... 182 
D.  Application of Liability to Service Providers as well as Product 
Providers ............................................................................................. 184 
E.  Is Contributory Trademark Infringement Different from 
Contributory Copyright Infringement? ............................................... 184 
III.  When Can Intent Be Imputed? ....................................................................... 185 
A.  Chasing Imputed Intent: A Case-By-Case Approach .......................... 185 
1.  The Design of a Product ............................................................... 186 
2.  When the Actual and Prospective Use of a Product or Service 
and Online Services is Known: The Implicit and Explicit 
Actual Knowledge Requirement .................................................. 188 
3.  The Problems with Eroding “Constructive Knowledge” and 
the “Actual Knowledge” Requirement ......................................... 190 
4.  Does It Even Matter or Is It All Just Dicta?  The Shift to 
Alternative Doctrines ................................................................... 191 
5.  Does it Even Matter or Is it All Just Dicta?  The Three 
Underlying Factors ....................................................................... 195 
6.  Identifying the Three Factors in Seminal Cases ........................... 200 
B.  The Continuation of Common Law Principles in the DMCA ............. 207 
1.  Provisions Under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) ............................................ 208 
2.  Provisions Under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) ........................................... 209 
3.  Identifying the Three Factors in the DMCA ................................ 209 
4.  The Policy Goals Behind Limiting Constructive Knowledge 
Upheld Through the DMCA ........................................................ 211 
IV.  A Look at Two Recent 2010 cases in Light of the Three Factors .................. 212 
A.  A Recent Contributory Trademark Infringement Case: Tiffany 
(NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) .............................. 212 
180 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. V:I 
 
B.  A Recent Contributory Trademark Infringement Case: Viacom 
International Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) ................................................................................................... 213 
V.  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 213 
 
ABSTRACT 
The doctrines of contributory copyright liability and contributory trademark 
liability are both based on the confluence of basic tort liability and the policy goal 
of encouraging innovation and commerce.  Because the two concepts sometimes 
conflict, courts have struggled to create a comprehensive body of law to reach a 
reconciliation.  The doctrine of contributory copyright liability evolved through a 
rich body of case law that was subsequently supplemented by the legislatively 
enacted Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).  In contrast, the doctrine of 
contributory trademark liability is a purely common law doctrine and has not 
witnessed legislative intervention.  This article posits that the contributory 
trademark doctrine has evolved in a parallel manner to the contributory copyright 
doctrine through judicial common law, with courts imposing liability based on the 
same principles and factors as those underlying findings of liability in copyright 
cases.  Thus, the same three factors can be identified that consistently distinguish 
cases of liability from those cases where the courts have not held service providers 
and distributors liable in both copyright and trademark cases.  Namely, courts 
reach findings of “liability” in cases where: (1) the users known to be attracted to 
the product/service are dubious; (2) an overriding percentage of uses are 
infringing; and (3) there is overt bad faith on the part of the service provider.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article proposes that the doctrines of contributory copyright and 
contributory trademark liability are based on the confluence of the doctrine of 
basic tort liability and the policy goal of encouraging innovation and vigorous 
commerce as new products and services are developed.1  Because basic tort 
liability relies on the concept of imputed intent, and this concept sometimes 
conflicts with the policy goal of encouraging innovation, courts have struggled to 
create a comprehensive body of law to reconcile the two.  Generally, and in the 
online context specifically, courts have come to similar outcomes in the arenas of 
contributory copyright and trademark liability, albeit through different paths of 
legal evolution.  Underlying these results, three factors can be identified that 
consistently distinguish cases of liability from those cases where the courts have 
                                                          
* J.D., UCLA School of Law, Class of 2011.  B.A. Communications, University of California, Los 
Angeles, Class of 2007.  B.A. Psychology, Touro College Los Angeles, Class of 2007.  My thanks to 
Professor Mark F. Grady at the UCLA School of Law for his guidance and insights during the writing 
of this article.  I would also like to thank the editorial staff at the Pepperdine Journal of Business, 
Entrepreneurship & the Law for helping me prepare this article for publication 
1 Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005) (citing 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)).   
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not held service providers and distributors liable. 
The doctrine of contributory copyright liability evolved through a rich body 
of case law that was subsequently supplemented by the legislatively enacted 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).2  The DMCA strove to keep 
copyright law intact while providing online service providers with certain “safe 
harbors” from liability.3  Though the legislatively imposed DMCA is said to have 
“shifted the burden” in the copyright context,4 the DMCA has been implemented 
by the same courts that developed the initial common law doctrine, applying the 
same policy goals as those underlying the initial common law.  These courts have 
interpreted and applied the DMCA so as to form a body of case law that is 
consistent with the initial body of contributory infringement case law.   
In contrast, the doctrine of contributory trademark liability is a purely 
common law doctrine and has not witnessed legislative intervention.  This article 
posits, however, that the contributory trademark doctrine has evolved in a parallel 
manner to the contributory copyright doctrine through judicial common law, with 
courts imposing liability based on the same principles and factors as those 
underlying findings of liability in copyright cases.  Hence, both trademark and 
copyright contributory liability have evolved similar doctrines, reaching congruent 
results when applied to recent cases in the online context.   
II.  THE ORIGINS OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT 
A.  The Lanham Act—Trademark Infringement 
Section 32 of the Lanham Act prohibits any person from using another’s 
mark without permission “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, 
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which 
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .”5  To 
be liable under section 32, a person must use the mark on competing or related 
goods in a way that creates a likelihood of confusion.6   
B.  The Copyright Act—Copyright Infringement 
The Copyright Act states, in pertinent part:  
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of [a] copyright . . . has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords . . . (3) to distribute copies or 
                                                          
2 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2010); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, PUB. L. NO. 105–304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (1998). 
3 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).   
4 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The DMCA 
notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially 
infringing material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the 
copyright.”). 
5 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a) (West 2005).   
6 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D. Cal. 1997) 
(citations omitted), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1999).   
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phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of 
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending . . . (5) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly . . . .7  
C.  Basic Tort Law and Contributory Infringement: Imputed Intent 
In both copyright and trademark law, even if an individual has not directly 
infringed upon a copyright or trademark, he may nevertheless be liable under the 
doctrine of contributory infringement, “a judicially created doctrine that derives 
from the common law of torts.”8  Contributory infringement stems from the notion 
that one who directly contributes to another’s infringement should be held 
accountable.9  An argument for imposing indirect liability is that, in certain 
circumstances, “it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work 
effectively against all direct infringers, [and] the only practical alternative [is] to 
go against the [indirect infringer] for secondary liability on a theory of contributory 
or vicarious infringement.”10 
The Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., notes that even 
though the Supreme Court in the seminal case of MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., initially “tells us that contribution to infringement must be intentional for 
liability to arise,”11 Grokster later directs courts to analyze contributory liability in 
                                                          
7 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2002).   
8 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).  See Metro-
Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)  (“Although ‘[t]he 
copyright act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,’ these 
doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the 
law.”) (citations omitted).    
9 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 1 NIEL BOORSTYN, 
BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 10.06[2], at 10–21 (1994) (“In other words, the common law doctrine that 
one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortuous act is jointly and severally liable with the 
prime tortfeasor, is applicable under copyright law.”)); Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line 
Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 1995).  
Although there is no statutory rule of liability for infringement committed by 
others, “the absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not 
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringement on certain parties 
who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity.  For vicarious 
liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of 
contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of 
identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual 
accountable for the actions of another.” 
RTC, 907 F. Supp. at 1373 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
435 (1984)).   
10 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929–39 (holding that there was a strong argument for imposing indirect 
liability in the context of software service that allowed for the downloading of infringing content) 
(citing In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[r]ecognizing the 
impracticability or futility of a copyright owner’s suing a multitude of individual infringers”; also 
explaining that if a breach of contract can be prevented most effectively by actions taken by a third 
party, it makes sense to have a legal mechanism for placing liability for the consequences of the breach 
on the third party, as well as the party that broke the contract; and noting that a copyright license is just 
a type of contract)).   
11 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Grokster, 
545 U.S. at 930). 
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light of “rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”12  Common 
law principles establish when intent may be imputed; namely, “[t]ort law ordinarily 
imputes to an actor the intention to cause the natural and probable consequences of 
his conduct,” or “consequences . . .  certain, or substantially certain, to result from 
his act.”13  Thus, the underlying requisite for contributory liability under principles 
of tort law is “intent,” but this requisite may be satisfied by proof of actual intent 
or “imputed intent,” comprised of elements that amount to a proxy for intent.14   
The “rule” adopted by courts for purposes of contributory liability in 
copyright law, in line with the principles of “imputed intent,” is that “one who, 
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially 
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 
‘contributory’ infringer.”15  The “knowledge” requirement for contributory 
copyright infringement was further elaborated upon by courts over time to be an 
objective one: “it is sufficient that the defendant [know or] have reason to know 
that infringement is taking place.”16 
Courts have adopted a similar rule in the context of contributory trademark 
infringement; namely, that:  
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a 
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or 
distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm done as a result of the 
deceit.17 
Thus, consistent with basic tort law, contributory copyright and trademark 
infringers are both liable for their actions under similar standards, with language 
                                                          
12 Id. at 1170 (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934–35).   
13 Id. at 1171 (quoting DeVoto v. Pac. Fid. Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1347 (9th Cir. 1908); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965) (“If the actor knows that the consequences are 
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if 
he had in fact desired to produce the result.”) (emphasis added)). 
14 Id.; Perfect 10, Inc., v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 794–95 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(“Contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondary liability with roots in the tort-law 
concepts of enterprise liability and imputed intent.”) (citing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264); Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007)).   
15 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(citation omitted); see also Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264. 
16 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 487 (1984) (discussing Screen 
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 404–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) 
(holding individuals would be liable if “it could be demonstrated that they knew or should have known 
that they were dealing in illegal goods”)); see also Cable/Home Commc’ns Corp. v. Network Prods., 
Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845, 846 n.29 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. 
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding knowledge 
is whether the secondary infringer “knew or should have known” of the infringing activity); A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (using term “constructive knowledge” to 
describe viable alternative to actual knowledge); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 
2004).   
17 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Contributory infringement occurs when 
the defendant either intentionally induces a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark or supplies a 
product to a third party with actual or constructive knowledge that the product is being used to infringe 
the service mark.”). 
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requiring “knowledge” or “inducement” as a proxies for intent.   
D.  Application of Liability to Service Providers as well as Product 
Providers 
It should be noted that under the common law, service providers, including 
internet service providers, are subject to the same liability as product providers, for 
both contributory copyright and trademark infringement purposes, according to the 
principles of tort liability.18   
E.  Is Contributory Trademark Infringement Different from Contributory 
Copyright Infringement? 
In dicta, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Inwood test to require that the 
contributory infringer have (1) knowledge of the direct infringer’s identity, as 
opposed to mere identification of the infringing goods required by copyright law,19 
and  (2) knowledge that the goods are indeed “infringing” as opposed to using the 
trademark in a permitted way.20  As a result, courts have espoused the view that 
the knowledge standard is harder to satisfy in trademark cases than in copyright 
cases.21   
                                                          
18 See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 
1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) & cmt. d (1979); other citation omitted). 
[T]reat[ing] trademark infringement as a species of tort and have turned to the 
common law to guide our inquiry into the appropriate boundaries of liability. . . .  
[T]he Restatement of Torts tells us that [an individual] is responsible for the torts 
of those it permits on its premises ‘knowing or having reason to know that the 
other is acting or will act tortiously. . . .’  The common law, then, imposes the 
same duty on landlords and licensors that the Supreme Court has imposed on 
manufacturers and distributors. 
Id.; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004 (upholding that district court’s ruling that without support services 
defendant provides, users could not download infringing content, and hence, that Napster as a service 
provider is akin to a landlord providing “the site and facilities” for direct infringement”); Tiffany (NJ) 
Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Inwood’s test for contributory trademark 
infringement applies on its face to manufacturers and distributors of goods.  Courts have, however, 
extended the test to providers of services.”). 
19 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (quoting Inwood, 456 U.S. at 855; emphases added) (“Sony certainly 
does not ‘intentionally induce[]’ its customers to make infringing uses of [the plaintiffs’] copyrights, 
nor does it supply its products to identified individuals known by it to be engaging in continuing 
infringement of [the plaintiffs’] copyrights. . . .’”). 
20 Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 964 (“Contributory infringement doctrine has always treated 
uncertainty of infringement as relevant to the question of an alleged contributory infringer’s knowledge. 
. . .  The existence of numerous legitimate, non-infringing uses of the term . . . further illustrates the 
uncertainty inherent in the question of whether [defendant] knew or had reason to know of infringing 
uses of domain name registrations.”). 
21 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19 (“If Inwood’s narrow standard for contributory trademark 
infringement governed here, [the plaintiffs’] claim of contributory infringement would merit little 
discussion.”); Lockheed, 985 F. Supp at 951, 966 (finding no knowledge, either actual or constructive, 
of potential infringing uses by domain name registrants, because of “the inherent uncertainty in defining 
the scope of intellectual property rights in a trademark,” and the subsequent “uncertainty inherent in any 
determination that use of a domain name is infringing”); id. at 965 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439, n.19) 
(“Because the property right protected by trademark law is narrower than that protected by copyright 
law, liability for contributory infringement of a trademark is narrower than liability for contributory 
infringement of a copyright.”).   
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These two distinguishing issues are often moot, especially in the online 
context.  With regard to the “additional” requirement in trademark law that the 
contributory infringer have knowledge of the direct infringer’s identity, as opposed 
to mere identification of the infringing goods,22 in the online context identification 
of the infringing goods and identification of the direct infringer’s identity are 
frequently compounded—occurring concurrently.  For example, once a posting of 
an infringing good or use of an infringing domain name is identified by a service 
provider, the online identity of the user is also identifiable (unless, of course, the 
service provider has explicitly created a service that encrypts users’ identities).23  
With regard to the requirement that the contributory infringer know that goods are 
indeed infringing, as opposed to employing a trademark for a permitted use,24 in 
the copyright context, a comparable type of knowledge is required.  A contributory 
infringer is similarly required to know that a work has indeed been infringed, as 
opposed to being copied legally, such as under the fair use doctrine.25  Thus, in a 
practical sense, in the online context the basic knowledge standard for contributory 
copyright and trademark infringement do not differ significantly. 
III.  WHEN CAN INTENT BE IMPUTED?   
A.  Chasing Imputed Intent: A Case-By-Case Approach 
In copyright and trademark law, the courts have developed complex dicta, in 
an attempt to accommodate a second policy goal that, in some instances, competes 
with the reasoning behind the doctrine of “imputed intent” in tort law.  This second 
policy goal is “the value of innovative technology,” or “leav[ing] breathing room 
for innovation and a vigorous commerce.”26  When a new service with new 
capabilities emerges, courts are concerned with preserving potential commercial 
growth from that service’s non-infringing capabilities, even if these same 
capabilities can be put to infringing uses.27  This policy goal weighs especially 
heavily in the online context, where new services have expansive potential uses—
                                                          
22 Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19. 
23 See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations 
omitted) (holding that defendant can not avoid liability by using encryption software to prevent himself 
from learning that (maybe all) the users of his service are copyright infringers). 
24 Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 964. 
25 See Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 
1373–74 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (denying preliminary injunction due to a material question of fact as to 
whether internet service provider “knew or should have known” of infringement following receipt of a 
notice letter stating that copyrighted work had been posted on its system, when there was a colorable 
question of fair use; “[w]here a[n online service] operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of 
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack of copyright notices on the copies, 
or the copyright holder’s failure to provide the necessary documentation to show that there is a likely 
infringement, the operator’s lack of knowledge will be found reasonable and there will be no liability 
for contributory infringement for allowing the continued distribution of the works on its system.”). 
26 Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,  933 (2005) 
(citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).   
27 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The Sony Court 
declined to impute the requisite level of knowledge where the defendants made and sold equipment 
capable of both infringing and ‘substantial noninfringing uses.’”) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442). 
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both infringing and non-infringing—that can spur prospective commercial growth.  
However, the opposing policy of protecting copyrights is just as strong in the 
online context, where “digital distribution of copyrighted material threatens 
copyright holders as never before[:] because every copy is identical to the original, 
copying is easy.”28  The Supreme Court has recognized the gravity of the dilemma 
in balancing:  
[T]he respective values of supporting creative pursuits through copyright protection 
and promoting innovation in new communication technologies by limiting the 
incidence of liability for copyright infringement.  The more artistic protection is 
favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration 
of copyright law is an exercise in managing the tradeoff.29  
In balancing the doctrine of imputed intent with the goal of commercial 
growth, courts have slowly defined the contributory liability doctrine on a case-by-
case basis by identifying instances where liability should be imposed.  In 
contributory copyright and trademark law, generally, and in cases regarding online 
service providers, specifically, courts have constructed dicta that seem to 
significantly increase the awareness necessary to meet the “knowledge” standard in 
an effort to further the goal of commercial growth. From dicta, it may seem that 
through this process, the courts have weakened the “imputed intent doctrine” to 
reach findings of “no liability.” 
However, a closer look at the case law reveals that the individual case 
outcomes are consistent with the doctrine of imputed intent, and that despite broad 
dicta, courts still reach findings of “liability” in cases where certain factors appear: 
(1) the users known to be attracted to the product or service are dubious; (2) an 
overriding percentage of uses is infringing; and (3) there is overt bad faith on the 
part of the service provider.  The same courts espousing limiting dicta simply 
employ alternative reasoning and doctrines to reach results of “liability” in cases 
where the policy goal of “commercial growth” is inexorably overridden by a strong 
proof of “imputed intent” due to provision of a product or service to a dubious set 
of users, an overwhelming percentage of infringing uses, and proof of overt bad 
faith on the part of the service provider.  
1.  The Design of a Product 
Regarding whether intent may be imputed purely from the design of a 
product, courts have made two key holdings: first, intent may be imputed, and 
liability may be predicated upon “distributing a product distributees use to infringe 
copyrights, if the product is not capable of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially 
significant’ non-infringing uses.”30  This rule is completely consistent with the 
                                                          
28 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 928–29.  
29 Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“The [Supreme] Court was unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by 
means of a new technology at the price of possibly denying noninfringing consumers the benefit of the 
technology.”). 
30 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Grokster, 
545 U.S. at 942). 
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doctrine of imputed intent in tort law: even if the distributor did not specifically 
intend that his product be used for infringement, if the product or service is not 
capable of any substantial legal use, tort law would dictate imputing to the 
distributor the intention to cause infringement as the “natural and probable”31 
consequences of his conduct.32  This rule is also completely consistent with the 
policy goal of furthering commercial growth: because the product (or service) has 
no commercially significant non-infringing uses, no legitimate commercial growth 
is being stymied by holding the contributory infringer liable and limiting the 
product’s or service’s availability.33 
Conversely, the Supreme Court held that intent may not be imputed, and 
liability may not arise, merely because a product capable of infringing use has been 
sold, so long as the product is also “capable of substantial non-infringing uses.” 34  
This rule, likewise, is consistent with the doctrine of imputed intent in tort law 
because, so far as the service provider is concerned, infringement is not the only 
“natural and probable” consequence35 of selling that product; non-infringing 
conduct is just as “natural and probable” since the product has equal capabilities 
for facilitating infringing and non-infringing conduct.36  Consequently, in the 
online context, courts have held that “a computer system operator cannot be [held] 
liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system 
allows for the exchange of copyrighted material.”37  
This rule is also completely consistent with the policy goal of furthering 
commercial growth: because the product has commercially significant non-
infringing uses, legitimate commercial growth would be obstructed by holding the 
contributory infringer liable and limiting the availability of the product or 
service.38  
                                                          
31 See id. at 1171 (internal quotation omitted). 
32 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932 (“In sum, where an article is ‘good for nothing else’ but 
infringement, there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice 
in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.”) (citations omitted). 
33 Id. 
34 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (rejecting 
imposition of liability based on “the fact that [Sony] sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the 
fact that their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted 
material”).   
35 See Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932–33 (“Conversely, the doctrine absolves the equivocal conduct of 
selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more 
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be misused.”); see A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).   
37 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020–21 (“[We] will not impute the requisite level of knowledge to Napster 
merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights.”) 
(citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436). 
38 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The [Supreme] Court 
was unwilling to allow copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by means of a new 
technology at the price of possibly denying non-infringing consumers the benefit of the technology.”). 
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2.  When the Actual and Prospective Use of a Product or Service and 
Online Services is Known: The Implicit and Explicit Actual 
Knowledge Requirement  
The true quandary arises, however, when the distributor of a product or 
service has knowledge that his product or service will be used, or is already being 
used, for substantial infringing activity.  As soon as the distributor knows that the 
vast majority of uses of the product are infringing or will be infringing, it becomes 
“certain, or substantially certain” that the product or service will be used for 
infringing conduct.39  Under the common law doctrine of torts, it would seem that 
liability should be imposed and intent should be imputed, because in this case, 
infringement is the “natural and probable consequence[s] of [the distributor’s] 
conduct.”40  However, to hold an individual liable under the imputed intent 
doctrine if the product is capable of substantial non-infringing uses, even if the 
product is being used or will be used almost singularly for non-infringing uses, 
could be perceived to quash room for innovation and vigorous commerce by 
creating liability for a product or service that has substantial potential for non-
infringing uses.41  Additionally, there is a concern that an innocent “defendant 
[who] merely [intended to] sell[ ] a commercial product suitable for some lawful 
use,” will be ambushed by liability when the product is overridingly used by 
infringers. 42  Thus, in this situation, the desire to protect innovation and commerce 
appears to conflict with the imputed intent doctrine.   
Prior to Grokster, some lower courts touted these principles of tort law, 
stating that liability should be imposed on a distributor who has knowledge that 
most current or prospective uses of his product or service are infringing, despite 
the capability for substantial non-infringing uses, unless the distributor can 
demonstrate substantial actual non-infringing uses.43  The subsequent Supreme 
Court language in Grokster read Sony to remove the ability to impute intent, and 
therefore knowledge, based on the characteristics or uses of a product (even if it 
the product is used primarily or solely for infringing purposes), so long as the 
product or service is capable of substantial non-infringing uses.44  However, it 
                                                          
39 Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b. 
(1965) (“If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his 
act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.”)). 
40 Id.; see Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980, 982, 987 (Coco-Cola 
claimed a rival soft drink maker had infringed Coca-Cola’s mark because bars purchasing the rival soft 
drink had substituted it for Coca-Cola; holding “[b]efore he can himself be held as a wrongdoer o[r] 
contributory infringer one who supplies another with the instruments by which that other commits a 
tort, must be shown to have knowledge that the other will or can reasonably be expected to commit a 
tort with the supplied instrument.”) (emphasis added).   
41 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933. 
42 Id. at 936. 
43 See In re Aimster Copryight Litig., 334 F.3d at 649–50, 652 (stating that “some estimate of the 
respective magnitudes of [] uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement” and holding 
that even though the evidence did not exclude the possibility of substantial non-infringing  uses, the 
burden of production was on Aimster to demonstrate that its service has substantial non-infringing uses, 
not is merely capable of them) (emphasis added). 
44 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933–34. 
Sony barred secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause 
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should be noted that despite this dicta, the court officially reserved the issue “of the 
point of balance between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on 
distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.”45 
As a result of the ambiguity surrounding this issue, courts have struggled 
with exactly how much “knowledge” is required to impute intent.  Implicit in 
Grokster’s reading of Sony,46 is a limitation on the facts that can be considered in 
determining whether a distributor has constructive knowledge of infringement; 
namely, the known actual uses of a product cannot be considered in determining 
whether constructive knowledge (or imputed intent) exists.47  In past cases, actual 
use of a product was the primary basis for inferring constructive knowledge (e.g. 
massive proportion of use was infringing),48 and therefore Grokskter’s 
interpretation of Sony effectively imposes a requirement of actual knowledge.  
In light of Grokster, it is not surprising that in the online context, specifically 
in cases where the overriding majority of uses are infringing, courts have explicitly 
required actual knowledge, thereby deeming the constructive knowledge doctrine 
entirely ineffective:  
For providers of Internet services, . . .  a more refined test applies . . . a computer 
system operator can be held contributorily liable if it has actual knowledge that 
specific infringing material is available using its system[] . . . and can take simple 
measures to prevent further damage to copyrighted works, . . . yet continues to 
provide access to infringing works.49   
These holdings seem to further whittle away the stronghold of imputed intent 
and extend the Sony ruling; whereas, at most, Sony eliminated only one type of 
                                                          
infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of 
substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for 
infringement. . . .  Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law 
from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. 
Id. at 941.  “[Sony] struck a balance between the interests of protection and innovation by holding that 
the products capability of substantial lawful employment should bar the imputation of fault and 
consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts of others.”  Id. 
45 Id. at 934 (“[W]here evidence goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it 
may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, 
Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability”; stressing that evidence that product may be put to 
infringing use is insufficient, in contrast to inducement, but not discussing when there is evidence that 
the product has been put to infringing use); see id. at 935. 
46 The relevant quote in Sony, that is the cause of so much deliberation, follows:  
If vicarious liability is to be imposed on petitioners in this case it must rest on the 
fact that they have sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that 
their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of 
copyrighted material.  There is no precedent in the law of copyright for the 
imposition of vicarious liability on such a theory.   
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). 
47 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934 (stating that the Sony case was “one about liability resting on 
imputed intent,” not one about “liability on any theory”).  “Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent 
as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product.”  Id. 
48 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that constructive 
knowledge existed when infringement took place in “massive quantities” and “routinely” at operators’ 
swap meet). 
49 Miller v. Facebook, Inc., No. C 10–00264 WHA, 2010 WL 2198204, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. May 
28, 2010) (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007))) (internal 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)).   
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constructive knowledge, holding that mere design or structure of a service 
(capability of being used for infringing conduct) is insufficient to impute 
“knowledge.”50  Napster extended Sony, requiring actual, specific knowledge and 
holding that constructive knowledge is never sufficient, even where it stems from 
facts other than product design or use.51  Actual knowledge has also been 
explicitly required by courts in the trademark context.52 
3.  The Problems with Eroding “Constructive Knowledge” and the 
“Actual Knowledge” Requirement  
Several problems exist with eroding the “constructive knowledge” doctrine 
generally, and specifically, in requiring actual knowledge in the online context.  
First, barring courts from considering constructive knowledge (either explicitly or 
effectively) in their liability calculus directly eats away at an established principle 
of tort law—namely that if an individual has “reason to know” that he is aiding and 
abetting an illegal act, he should be held liable.53  Furthermore, though the stated 
reason behind the “actual knowledge” requirement in the online context is the 
inability of an online service provider to examine every hyperlink for potentially 
defamatory material,54 this reasoning still does not explain why a provider of an 
online service used overwhelmingly (or entirely) for infringing uses (with no 
actual substantial non-infringing uses), should not be held liable for continuing to 
offer the service, regardless of whether specific instances of infringement can be 
identified easily.  Finally, such an approach cuts against an accumulated 
established body of case law holding that constructive knowledge generally, and 
actual and prospective use of a product or service in particular, are important 
                                                          
50 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436) (“[A] computer system operator cannot 
be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the 
exchange of copyrighted material.”). 
51 Id. at 1021 (“[A]bsent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer 
system operator cannot be held liable for contributory infringement . . . .  We agree that if a computer 
system operator learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such 
material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement.”) (citing 
Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1374 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995)); Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374 (holding that for online bulletin board operator to have 
sufficient knowledge, the copyright holder must “provide the necessary documentation to show that 
there is a likely infringement”); Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d at 726–27 (after stating that sale of a 
product with a particular design is an improper basis for imputing intent if the product is capable of 
substantial non-infringing use, the court did not consider if constructive knowledge could be proven in 
another way, and moved on to analysis of whether Google “knowingly t[ook] steps . . .  substantially 
certain to result in such direct infringement”). 
52 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] service provider must have 
more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell counterfeit goods 
. . . [s]ome contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe in the 
future is necessary.”).  
53 See Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171 (“Tort law ordinarily imputes to an actor the intention 
to cause the natural and probable consequences of his conduct,” or “consequences [] certain, or 
substantially certain, to result from his act.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b. 
(1965))). 
54 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (citing Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 141 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
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considerations in determining liability.55 
This article proposes that though some courts have verbally stripped the 
constructive knowledge doctrine, and claim to disregard certain factors such as the 
percentage of use that is infringing and the type of users attracted to a product or 
service,56 in reality (1) courts have employed other doctrines to hold individuals 
liable where fact patterns dictate that liability be found due to the existence of 
constructive knowledge; (2) recent results are consistent with prior case law, 
because despite dicta stating that the holdings are based on different legal 
doctrines, several underlying factors can be identified that consistently distinguish 
cases of liability from those cases where the courts have not held distributors 
liable;57 and (3) the policy goals behind dicta limiting constructive knowledge 
have been maintained through the DMCA’s safe harbors and the common law.   
4.  Does It Even Matter or Is It All Just Dicta?  The Shift to Alternative 
Doctrines 
This article proposes that despite the erosion of the constructive knowledge 
doctrine, courts have employed alternate doctrines to hold individuals liable where 
key factors dictate that liability be found, all the while building and maintaining a 
body of case law with consistent results and comporting with the original common 
law doctrine of imputed intent.58  Three such doctrines that have been used to hold 
individuals liable for contributory infringement are: (1) actual knowledge; (2) 
inducement; and (3) willful blindness. 
a.  Actual Knowledge 
The simplest doctrine employed by courts to hold individuals liable when 
key factors dictate that liability should be found is the doctrine of actual 
knowledge.59  To meet this doctrine in the online context, a service provider must 
                                                          
55 See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding 
plaintiff adequately alleged the element of knowledge when swap-meet operators were aware of “on-
going sales of infringing material” due to a letter and raids seizing 38,000 counterfeit recordings; even 
though operators lacked actual knowledge of specific infringing conduct or specific infringing vendors, 
liability was found due to fact that operators knew that premise was used substantially for sale of 
infringing goods, serving as proof of imputed intent); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 (reasoning that from 
the record, Napster had “knowledge, both actual and constructive,” of direct infringement, supporting a 
finding of liability); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding liability 
based on the failure of Aimster “to produce any evidence that its service has ever been used for a non-
infringing use, let alone evidence concerning the frequency of such uses”); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 
F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (found “reason to know” to be basis for holding online service provider 
liable).    
56 See, e.g,. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 (criticizing the district court for “plac[ing] undue weight on 
the proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future non-infringing use”). 
57 See Perfect 10, Inc., v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (proposing that 
holdings in different cases are factually consistent). 
58 Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934–35 (2005) 
(“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case 
was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”). 
59 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020–21 (citations omitted) (relying, in its reasoning, on existence of 
actual knowledge for its finding of liability even though “it [wa]s apparent from the record that Napster 
has knowledge, both actual and constructive of direct infringement. . . .”); but see Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 
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have actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its 
system and be able to take simple measures to prevent further damage to 
copyrighted works.60  Courts have held that intent to assist infringement can be 
imputed to a service provider with such knowledge.61 
b.  Inducement   
The second doctrine employed by courts to hold individuals liable when key 
factors dictate that liability should be found is the inducement doctrine.  The 
Supreme Court adopted the concept of “inducement” from patent law, finding that 
“[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct 
infringement” in the copyright context.62  In Grokster, the Supreme Court held that 
distribution with “direct evidence of unlawful purpose,” such as “statements or 
actions directed to promoting infringement,” may be enough to prompt liability; 
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”63  
The classic case of inducement is by enticing or persuading another to infringe, 
such as by advertising an infringing use or instructing a user how to engage in 
infringing use.64   
Some courts have stated that the knowledge standard must be proven 
independently from the inducement standard in the copyright context, based on the 
standard test language from Gershwin, that a defendant is a contributory infringer 
if he has “[(1)] knowledge of the infringing activity, [and (2)] induces, causes, or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another . . . .”65  However, in 
Grokster, no mention was made of a separate knowledge requirement; merely 
demonstrating inducement was sufficient.  Thus, separate allegation and proof of 
the element of “knowledge” is not required in the copyright inducement context.66   
In the trademark context, inducement has long been established as a way to 
establish liability.67  Furthermore, in trademark law, the knowledge requirement 
                                                          
264 (where court just stated “that plaintiff adequately alleged the element of knowledge,” but didn’t 
explain whether knowledge was actual or constructive, and seemingly, from the facts and reasoning 
based its holding on constructive knowledge since operators lacked actual knowledge of specific 
infringing conduct or specific infringing vendors). 
60 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.   
61 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Although neither 
Napster nor Netcom expressly required a finding of intent . . . both decisions ruled that a service 
provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions could be the basis for imposing contributory 
liability.  Under such circumstances, intent may be imputed.”). 
62 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; Visa, 494 F.3d at 795 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930).   
63 Grokster,545 U.S. at 935–37 (emphasis added).   
64 Id. at 935–36. 
65 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(citations omitted); see Visa, 494 F.3d 788 (stating that the knowledge element is separate from the 
material contribution or inducement element). 
66 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 935 (court performed no separate assessment of whether “knowledge” 
existed; inducement standard was met without proving knowledge; “where evidence goes beyond a 
product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing uses, and shows statements or 
actions direct to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability”). 
67 See William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 529–31 (1924) (drug 
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for imputing intent when a distributor continues to supply a product or service to 
someone whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement, is clearly severed from the requirements of inducement.68  Thus, 
separate allegation and proof of the element of “knowledge” is not required in the 
trademark inducement context. 
Courts have stated that inducement is the doctrine employed when actual 
evidence of intent exists, and as such, intent does not have to be imputed.69  
However, because the line between proven intent and imputed intent is a fine one, 
several cases that fall under the category of imputed intent arguably could also be 
construed to meet the “proven intent” standard.70   
c.  Willful Blindness 
The third doctrine employed by courts to hold individuals liable when key 
factors dictate that liability should be found is the willful blindness doctrine.  
Willful blindness has been used in both the trademark and copyright context.71  
Courts have held “that willful blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for 
purposes of the Lanham Act.”72  In the trademark context, courts have explained 
that “[t]o be willfully blind, a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately 
                                                          
manufacturer, whose salesmen suggested to distributors that prescriptions for plaintiff’s drug could be 
filled by substituting defendant’s drug, held liable for intentionally inducing distributors to pass off the 
defendant’s drug to purchasers as the plaintiff’s, either in direct terms or by suggestion or insinuation; 
“[o]ne who induces another to commit a fraud and furnishes the means of consummating it is equally 
guilty and liable for the injury”).  
68 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (the rule in the context of 
contributory trademark infringement is that “if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces 
another to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorily 
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.”) (emphases added); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Contributory infringement occurs when 
the defendant either intentionally induces a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark or supplies a 
product to a third party with actual or constructive knowledge that the product is being used to infringe 
the service mark.”). 
69 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934 (“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if 
there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived 
from the common law.”).   
70 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001) (court 
held that Napster was liable under the doctrine of “knowledge” plus “material contribution,” but noting 
that Napster executives “promoted the site with screen shots listing infringing files”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis added); Visa, 494 F.3d at 795 (“In an Internet context, we have found 
contributory liability when the defendant ‘engages in personal conduct that encourages or assists the 
infringement.’”) (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 
264 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that knowledge was adequately alleged, and finding sufficient evidence to 
show material contribution but also finding that “Cherry Auction actively strives to provide the 
environment and market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive.  Its participation in the sales cannot be 
termed ‘passive,’ as Cherry Auction would prefer”). 
71 See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 
1992) (defining willful blindness and remanding to determine whether the evidence supports a 
conclusion of willful blindness); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright law [] where indeed it maybe enough that the defendant 
should have known of the direct infringement.”) (citations omitted). 
72 Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149 (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 
1989)).   
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fail to investigate.”73  However, an individual does not have an affirmative duty to 
take reasonable precautions against the sale of counterfeits or to seek out and 
prevent violations—the “reason to know” standard for contributory liability only 
requires an individual to understand what a reasonably prudent person would 
understand without further investigation.74   
Willful blindness has been given a parallel definition in the copyright 
context; it is also considered equivalent to knowledge in the copyright law context:  
[W]here indeed it may be enough that the defendant should have known of the 
direct infringement, as it is in the law generally. . . . One who, knowing or strongly 
suspecting that he is involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he 
does not acquire full or exact knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings 
is held to have a criminal intent, because a deliberate effort to avoid guilty 
knowledge is all that the law requires to establish a guilty state of mind.75   
Willful blindness is a doctrine where intent is imputed because a provider 
takes steps to make sure not to acquire information that would have led him to 
knowledge of direct infringement sufficient to impute intent. 76  Because the line 
between these two methods of imputing intent is a fine one, several cases where 
courts employ the doctrine of “knowledge” to hold a provider liable arguably could 
also be construed to meet the “willful blindness” standard.77 
d.  Conclusion 
The three doctrines under which courts impose contributory liability—
inducement, willful blindness, and “knowledge” plus “material contribution”—are 
not entirely independent.  These doctrines pose varying manifestations of the same 
concepts of intent and imputed intent derived from common tort law.  Courts claim 
to employ the inducement standard when evidence of intent is most clear; because 
actual evidence of intent exists, intent does not have to be imputed.78  In situations 
                                                          
73 Id.   
74 Id.   
75 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted) (holding that defendant can 
not avoid liability by using encryption software to prevent himself from learning that most (and maybe 
all) the users of his service are copyright infringers).   
76 Id.   
77 See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding liability and 
imputing intent under constructive knowledge doctrine; holding that AOL had reason to know of 
copyrighted works posted on its service because it prevented itself from acquiring actual knowledge of 
infringement by changing its contact e-mail address in unreasonable manner: it (1) failed to registering 
the change with the Copyright Office in a timely manner, and (2) failed “to configure the old e-mail 
address [for complaints] so that it would [] forward messages” to the new address or return new 
messages to their senders, so complaints went unheeded without notice to complainants that their 
messages had not been delivered); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding liability for contributory copyright infringement based on actual and constructive 
knowledge, but noting that “a document authored by Napster co-founder Sean Parker mentioned ‘the 
need to remain ignorant of users’ real names and IP addresses ‘since they are exchanging pirated 
music.’”); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Hard Rock 
Café, 955 F.2d at 1149) (finding contributory trademark infringement without elaborating how 
knowledge standard was met, and stating that “a swap meet cannot disregard its vendors’ blatant 
trademark infringements with impunity”). 
78 Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934 (2005) 
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where evidence of intent is less prominent, courts have held that intent to assist 
infringement can be imputed to a service provider with actual knowledge who 
continues to provide access to infringing works (or, as articulated in the online 
context, “actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its 
system,” when simple measures can be taken to prevent further damage).79  The 
reasoning behind imputing intent is that a passive omission (“knowing failure to 
prevent infringing actions”) is comparable to an act intending the infringing 
actions to occur. 80  Finally, under the willful blindness doctrine, intent is imputed 
because a provider takes steps to make sure not to acquire information that would 
have led him to knowledge of direct infringement sufficient to impute intent. 81   
Many courts attempt to delineate three distinct situations where intent or 
imputed intent may exist, analyzing whether liability should be imposed under any 
of the three separate doctrines.82  However, in reality all three doctrines are located 
along a continuous spectrum measuring the existence of “intent”; as a result, cases 
that are analyzed by courts under one doctrine could often be analyzed under 
another as well, leading some courts to blend the analysis for the different 
doctrines.83 
5.  Does it Even Matter or Is it All Just Dicta?  The Three Underlying 
Factors 
Courts have held online service providers liable for contributory 
infringement under a variety of different doctrines in internet cases, making it 
seemingly difficult for online service providers to predict the outcome in a given 
lawsuit.  This article considers the consolidated body of case-law concerning 
online contributory copyright and trademark infringement, and attempts to identify 
several factors that consistently distinguish cases of liability from those cases 
where the courts have not held internet service providers liable, even though 
according to case dicta, liability may have been analyzed under different legal 
doctrines.84  As described below, the three factors may manifest differently in each 
                                                          
(“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case 
was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”).   
79 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Napster, 239 
F.3d at 1022; Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 
1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995)); see id. at 727 (held that “an actor may be contributorily liable [under Grokster] 
for intentionally encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are 
substantially certain to result in such direct infringement”) (emphasis added). 
80 Id. (“Although neither Napster nor Netcom expressly required a finding of intent . . . both 
decisions ruled that a service provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions could be the basis 
for imposing contributory liability.  Under such circumstances, intent may be imputed.”).   
81 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d at 650 (citations omitted) (holding that defendant can 
not avoid liability by using encryption software to prevent himself from learning that most (and maybe 
all) the users of his service are copyright infringers).   
82 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc., v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 795–802 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(performing separate analysis as to whether “knowledge,” “material contribution,” or “inducement” 
existed).   
83 Id. at 801 (noting that “the Amazon.com court did not bifurcate its analysis of contributory 
liability into ‘material contribution’ liability and ‘inducement’ liability”). 
84 See id. at 795 (proposing that holdings in different cases are factually consistent and 
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of the different doctrines of inducement, knowledge, and willful blindness. 
The three factors identified by this article which consistently distinguish 
“liability” cases from “no liability” cases in the contributory trademark and 
copyright infringement contexts generally, and in the online context specifically, 
are: (1) whether the “users” known to be attracted to the product or service are 
“dubious” or not; (2) whether an overriding percentage of uses is infringing; and 
(3) whether there is overt bad faith on the part of the service provider.  Every case 
does not necessarily implicate all three factors; however, in a case where, for 
example, only two of the factors are implicated, this article proposes that they are 
still predictive of the outcome.  
These three factors are predictive of whether liability will be found in a 
given case, because the factors relate to the intersection of two competing goals 
underlying contributory infringement: (1) reaching results consistent with the 
underlying concept of “intent” or “imputed intent” based on common law tort 
doctrine, and (2) reaching results that further the policy goal of encouraging 
innovation and a vigorous commerce, as new products and services are 
developed.85  
a.  Dubious Users 
The first factor is when a distributor knows that the types of users attracted to 
its product or service are “dubious” or untrustworthy, and seeking to infringe; if 
present in a given case, this factor is predictive of a finding of liability.86  Once a 
service provider knows that the types of users attracted to its product or service are 
dubious it is not automatically liable; rather, its level of responsibility is 
heightened—especially this factor conflates with either of the others.  Policy-wise, 
this factor comports with both (1) the imputed intent doctrine (when the types of 
users attracted to a service/product are dubious, the “natural and probable 
consequence[]” of continuing to supply the service/product is infringement, and 
thus intent may be imputed),87  and (2) the policy goal of encouraging innovation 
when new products and services are developed, and the desire to encourage 
vigorous commerce does not extend to services or products that attract illegal 
conduct. 88   
                                                          
distinguishing present case factually from precedent to explain the contrary holding; “viewed in 
isolation, the language of the tests described is quite broad, but when one reviews the details of the 
actual ‘cases and controversies’ before the relevant court in each of the test-defining cases and the 
actual holdings in those cases, it is clear that the factual circumstances in this case are not analogous”). 
85 Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933–34 (2005) 
(citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984)) (“[Sony] struck a 
balance between the interests of protection and innovation . . . .”). 
86 See generally Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Aris Getty, Inc., 55 F.3d 718, 719 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(finding the defendant common carrier contributorily liable because it delivered unbranded gasoline to 
“dubious” gas stations it knew would resell the gasoline under the Getty brand name).  
87 “Tort law ordinarily imputes to an actor the intention to cause the natural and probable 
consequences of his conduct,” or “consequences [] certain, or substantially certain, to result from his 
act.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If the actor knows 
that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he 
is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.” (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b. (1965) (emphasis added))). 
88 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933, 941 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442) (“[Sony] struck a balance between 
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This factor features strongly under the inducement doctrine, where a 
provider actively solicits users that are dubious, as opposed to merely continuing to 
provide a service or product that is known to attract such users.89  The knowledge 
doctrine presents a more subtle manifestation of this factor: when a distributor 
knows generally that the types of users attracted to his product or service are 
dubious (constructive knowledge) or that particular dubious users are actually 
infringing (actual knowledge), and nevertheless continues to supply them with his 
unaltered product or service.90  Conversely, for a distributor who supplies a service 
or product to trustworthy users, without actual knowledge of the identity of 
specific infringers or specific instances of infringing conduct, courts are much less 
likely to find liability—the more trustworthy the general user body, the more 
knowledge of specific instances of infringement is required to lead to a finding of 
liability.91  Finally, under the willful blindness doctrine, a service provider 
suspects that the types of users attracted to his product or service are dubious, but 
blocks exposure to further information that would give him knowledge of 
particular instances of infringement or the ability to identify and terminate 
infringers.92  Thus, liability under all three legal doctrines is predicated on the 
contributory infringer’s knowledge that his product or service attracts dubious 
users.   
This factor is similarly predictive of liability when a particular subgroup of 
users is identified as dubious (as opposed to the general user base of a service).93  
This factor is also implicated in a court’s determination of whether a report of a 
specific instance of infringement or an infringing user, provides a distributor with 
                                                          
the interests of protection and innovation by holding that the product’s capability of substantial lawful 
employment should bar the imputation of fault and consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts 
of others.”).   
89 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 860–61 (1982) (White, J., concurring) 
(“[Eli Lilly] made clear that a finding of contributory infringement requires proof of either an intent to 
induce illegal substitution or continued sales to particular customers whom the manufacturer knows or 
should know are engaged in improper palming off.” (quoting William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924))  (emphasis added)). 
90 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding 
knowledge and imposing liability where “users” known to be attracted to Napster service were dubious, 
as evidenced by company document mentioning the “need to remain ignorant of users’ real names and 
IP addresses since they are exchanging pirated music”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
91 See, e.g., Inwood, 456 U.S. 844 (finding no liability, for continuing to supply generic pills that 
looked like trademarked pills to pharmacists, even though some pharmacists used the pills to infringe; 
because pharmacists were deemed to be trustworthy users who were not inclined to infringe, defendants 
did not have sufficient reason to know that pharmacists would substitute generic pills for regular ones).   
92 See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant 
cannot avoid liability by using encryption software to prevent himself from learning that most (and 
maybe all) the users of his service are copyright infringers; “one who, knowing or strongly suspecting 
that he is involved in shady dealings, takes steps to make sure that he does not acquire full or exact 
knowledge of the nature and extent of those dealings is held to have a criminal intent, because a 
deliberate effort to avoid guilty knowledge is all that the law requires to establish a guilty state of 
mind”) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
93 See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that AOL had 
reason to know that infringing copies of a work were stored on its servers, due to a phone call from an 
AOL subscriber reporting the existence of unauthorized copies of works by various authors on a 
particular USENET group, “alt.binaries.e-book”; the phone call labeling that USENET group as 
dubious users “should have put AOL on notice of the infringing activity on the particular USENET 
group at issue . . . .”).   
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adequate notice of infringement: in determining whether distributor has a “reason 
to know” that the use of a work was in fact infringing, courts have looked at 
whether the flagged individual is considered dubious.94   
Finally, this factor poses a potential explanation for the heightened 
requirement of “actual knowledge” in the online context,95 as well as the stringent 
DMCA notice requirements in the contributory copyright infringement context, 
and similarly demanding common law notice requirements in the trademark 
context.  Because so many varying individuals use online services, it is usually less 
feasible to label a service’s entire user-base “dubious,”96 and hence to impute 
intent in the online context, than to make the same determination regarding the 
limited users of a physical service or product.97  Furthermore, in the context of an 
online service used by numerous individuals, the second policy goal of furthering 
innovation and commerce is particularly strong, leaving courts reluctant to cut off 
a service with even potential non-infringing uses.98 
b.  Percentage of Use that Is Infringing  
Even though some courts claim that the percentage of use that is infringing is 
not to be considered in a court’s calculus as to whether to impose liability, so long 
as the product or service is capable of non-infringing uses;99 in actuality, the 
percentage of uses that is infringing is an important factor in the outcome of a case.  
When the overriding percentage of uses are infringing in a given case, this factor is 
                                                          
94 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 
1361, 1374–75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (held that evidence posed an issue of fact as to whether service 
provider had reason to know of infringing activity, in light of the fact that reported infringer was a non-
dubious, trustworthy former minister; “[in] the context of a dispute between a former minister and a 
church he is criticizing, [online service provider] may be able to show that its lack of knowledge that 
[online post] was infringing was reasonable”).   
95 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022. 
96 In many cases an online user-base constitutes a huge cross-section of the human population.   
97 Compare Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264–65 (9th Cir. 1996) (where 
court found knowledge, due to the fact that swap meet operator was aware of and disregarded dubious 
music vendors’ blatant sales of counterfeit recordings on its premises, and as such, “actively str[o]ve[] 
to provide the environment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive”) with Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (requiring that online service 
provider have “actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system,” because 
Google search engine is used and available to “all websites,” “automatically access[ing] thousands of 
websites,” and this entire group of Google users could not be deemed “dubious”) (quoting Napster, 239 
F.3d at 1022) .   
98 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1170; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021; Metro-
Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 931–34 (2005). 
99 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020–21 (refusing to impute requisite level of knowledge to Napster 
based on the fact a that large percentage of the use was infringing, because peer-to-peer file sharing 
technology is capable of other non-infringing uses; finding that the “district court improperly confined 
the use analysis to current uses, ignoring the system’s capabilities . . . [and] placed undue weight on the 
proportion of current infringing use as compared to current and future noninfringing use”) (citiation 
omitted) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442–43 (1984) 
(rejecting argument that merely supplying the “‘means’ to accomplish an infringing activity” leads to 
imposition of liability; framing the inquiry as whether the video tape recorder is “capable of 
commercially significant noninfringing uses”) (emphasis added)); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 
847 F.2d 255, 264–67 (5th Cir. 1997) (single non-infringing use implicated Sony). 
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predictive of a finding of liability.100  Policy-wise, this factor comports with both 
(1) the imputed intent doctrine (when the overriding percentage of uses of 
service/product is dubious, the “natural and probable consequence[ ]” of 
continuing to supply the service/product is infringement, and thus intent may be 
imputed),101 and (2) the policy goal of encouraging innovation when new products 
and services are developed, and the desire to encourage vigorous commerce does 
not extend to services or products that are being primarily used for illegal 
conduct.102  This factor features equally in cases analyzed under the inducement, 
willful blindness, and knowledge doctrines. 
c.  Bad Faith/ Good Faith 
The last factor, proof of overt bad faith on the part of the service provider, is 
predictive of a finding of liability.103  Overt bad faith exists when a service 
provider, through acts or omissions, demonstrates disregard of the law and the 
intent to be complicit with and further illegal conduct, such as by refusing to 
cooperate with legal authorities104 or flouting an existing infringement detection 
system.105  Overt bad faith may be visible from the outset of the provision of a 
product or service (such as in an inducement context)106 in addition to displaying 
overt bad faith upon initial distribution of their products, or after infringement 
                                                          
100 See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013, 1021 (stating that it was improper to confine use analysis 
to current uses, ignoring the system’s capabilities, but finding liability where 87% of files available on 
the Napster file sharing network were copyrighted). 
101 “Tort law ordinarily imputes to an actor the intention to cause the natural and probable 
consequences of his conduct,” or consequences “certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act . . 
. .”  Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171 (“If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or 
substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in 
fact desired to produce the result.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b. (1965) 
(emphasis added))).  The “natural consequences” of continuing to supply a product or service change 
based on the percentage of uses that are infringing.  C.f. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 
649, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding “[w]hat is true is that when a supplier is offering a product or service 
that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these 
uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement”; explaining that listing examples of 
potential noninfringing uses is not sufficient—”the [relevant] question is how probable [or frequent] 
they are”).   
102 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933, 941 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442) (“[Sony] struck a balance between 
the interests of protection and innovation by holding that the product’s capability of substantial lawful 
employment should bar the imputation of fault and consequent secondary liability for the unlawful acts 
of others.”).   
103 See e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 
a swap meet “[could] not disregard its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements with impunity,” when 
swap meet holder reneged on its promise to legal officials to collect identifying information about 
vendors) (citing Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th 
Cir. 1992)). 
104 See, e.g., id. at 261 (finding liability where swap meet operator failed to provide Sheriff with 
“identifying information from each vendor” after they had agreed to). 
105 See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding liability where 
AOL waited approximately half a year before registering the change of its contact e-mail address for 
complaints about copyright infringement with the U.S. Copyright Office, and did not configure the old 
e-mail address so that it would forward messages to the new address or return new messages to their 
senders, so complaints sent during that time period went unheeded, without those complainants being 
notified that their messages had not been delivered).   
106 See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923–25 (displaying overt bad faith from the beginning of 
distribution, by voicing illegal objectives). 
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begins to occur (such as in a willful blindness or knowledge context).107  Hence, 
the tenor of a distributor’s response to the knowledge that his product is being used 
for infringement becomes apparent from the totality of his behavior and approach 
towards the law and legal authorities, and this factor is clearly relevant in a context 
where courts are trying to determine level of intent.  
6.  Identifying the Three Factors in Seminal Cases 
a.  Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) 
In Fonovisa, the court found a swap meet operator liable based on a general 
“knowledge” theory (constructive versus actual knowledge was not specified).108  
In Fonovisa, the swap meet continued to provide facilities, after discovering that 
its facilities were attractive to dubious users; namely, the operator knew that it was 
creating swap meet facilities that were attracting shady, untrustworthy music 
vendors seeking to sell counterfeit wares.109  Furthermore, though an exact number 
is not given, it appears that a massive percentage of the uses of the swap meet 
facilities were infringing.110  Finally, in Fonovisa there was overt bad faith on the 
part of the swap meet operator from the time when pervasive infringement was 
discovered pursuant to raids and its own investigation, including reneging on its 
promise to legal officials to collect identifying information about vendors.111  The 
presence of the three key factors is consistent with a finding of liability. 
b.  Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 
1143 (7th Cir. 1992) 
In Hard Rock Café, the court held that the district court’s current findings did 
not support the conclusion of contributory liability, but remanded for a 
determination of whether evidence could support a finding of willful blindness 
under the correct standard.112  The court noted that relevant to whether the willful 
blindness standard could be met was whether the swap meet operator perceived the 
T-shirt vendors to be “dubious” or untrustworthy.113  The fact that the infringing 
                                                          
107 See, e.g., Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1077 (flouting its existing notice system by failing to promptly 
register a change in e-mail address and disregarding e-mails that were sent during the interim).   
108 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264–65. 
109 “There is also no dispute for purposes of this appeal that Cherry Auction and its operators were 
aware that vendors in their swap meet were selling counterfeit recordings in violation of Fonovisa’s 
trademarks and copyrights. . . .”  Id. at 261.  “Cherry Auction actively strives to provide the 
environment and the market for counterfeit recording sales to thrive.”  Id. at 264.   
110 “Sheriff’s Department raided the Cherry Auction swap meet and seized more than 38,000 
counterfeit recordings.”  Id. at 264.  “[I]t would be difficult for the infringing activity to take place in 
the massive quantities alleged without the support services provided by the swap meet.”  Id. (emphasis 
added).   
111 “Sheriff sent a letter notifying Cherry Auction of the on-going sales of infringing materials, and 
reminding Cherry Auction that they had agreed to provide the Sheriff with identifying information from 
each vendor.  In addition, in 1993, Fonovisa itself sent an investigator to the Cherry Auction site and 
observed sales of counterfeit recordings.”  Id. at 261 (emphasis added).  “[A] swap meet cannot 
disregard its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements with impunity.”  Id. at 265 (citing Hard Rock 
Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
112 Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149.   
113 Id. at 1147, 1149. 
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shirts had cut labels and were being sold for a cheap price (suspicious, dubious 
behavior) was to be weighed against the fact that the T-shirts were made by 
approved manufacturers and “[t]here does not seem to be any particular reason to 
believe that inexpensive t-shirts with cut labels are obviously counterfeit” 
(unsuspicious, non-dubious behavior) in determining whether or not the swap meet 
manager suspected infringement and hence was willfully blind in failing to 
investigate. 114  Thus one could conclude that T-shirt vendors one has not been 
warned against trusting,115 are less dubious and untrustworthy than music sellers 
attracted to swap meets that have been extensively raided116 or vendors of 
counterfeit Louis Vuitton and Gucci.117   
Furthermore, the other factors in this case pointed towards a lack of liability: 
the percentage of infringing uses of the swap meet grounds was relatively low,118 
and there was no appearance of overt bad faith on the part of the swap meet 
operator after infringement was discovered.  Unlike Fonovisa, in Hard Rock Café 
infringement was not discovered before filing suit,119 and the operator did not 
renege on a promise to legal officials to collect identifying information about 
vendors.  Because the implicated key factors did not point clearly towards liability, 
it is not surprising that the court held that the evidence presented a close question 
of fact as to whether the swap meet operator was willfully blind to infringement.120 
c.  Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) 
In Ellison, the court found an Internet service provider, America Online 
(AOL), liable based on a “constructive knowledge” theory, even though Ellison 
lacked actual knowledge.121  In Ellison, AOL continued to provide services to a 
                                                          
114 Id. (“[Vendors] were selling t-shirts made by approved manufacturers . . . .”  Despite the low 
price and “low quality,” T-shirts were “made by approved manufacturers,” and Hard Rock gave no 
warning about the sale of counterfeits prior to filing suit, and “made no effort to broadcast the 
information that legitimate Hard Rock t-shirts could only be found in Hard Rock Cafes.”).  The Hard 
Rock Café court also noted the manager of the flea market saw the infringing shirts and:  
[H]ad the opportunity to note that they had cut labels and were being sold cheap.  
Further [the manager] testified that he did not ask vendors whether their goods 
were counterfeit because they were sure to lie to him.  One might infer from 
these facts that [the manager] suspected that the shirts were counterfeits but 
chose not to investigate.  On the other hand . . . it is undisputed that Hard Rock 
made no effort to broadcast the information that legitimate Hard Rock t-shirts 
could only be found in Hard Rock Cafes.  Moreover, there does not seem to be 
any particular reason to believe that inexpensive t-shirts with cut labels are 
obviously counterfeit, no matter what logo they bear.   
Id. at 1149. 
115 Id. at 1147 (“At no point before filing suit did Hard Rock warn [the defendant] . . . that the 
shirts were counterfeits.”). 
116 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261, which the court labeled a clear case of liability. 
117 Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding genuine Vuitton and 
Gucci bags are unlikely to display poor workmanship or purple vinyl linings).   
118 Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1146 (“Before this case there [had] been [only] a few seizures of 
counterfeit goods at Swap-O-Rama flea markets.”).  
119 Id. at 1147 (“At no point before filing suit did Hard Rock warn [defendant] that the shirts were 
counterfeits.”). 
120 Id. at 1149. 
121 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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particular USENET group, after being put on notice that the particular group 
“alt.binaries.e-books” was attractive to dubious users; namely, users who were 
posting unauthorized copies of works by various authors.122  Furthermore, the 
evidence showed that the overriding percentage of uses of this particular USENET 
group was infringing.123  Finally, AOL demonstrated overt bad faith by changing 
its contact e-mail address for receiving complaints and reports of copyright 
infringement in an unreasonable manner that showed blatant disregard for reports 
of illegal activity.124  The presence of the three key factors is consistent with the 
finding that AOL had “reason to know” that infringing copies of Ellison’s work 
were stored on its USENET service, and hence was contributorily liable. 
d.  Religious Technology Center (RTC) v. Netcom On-line Communication 
Services Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
In RTC, the court denied motions for a preliminary injunction125 and 
summary judgment, finding that the evidence posed an issue of fact as to whether 
an online service operator had reason to know of infringing activity, in light of the 
fact that the reported infringer was a non-dubious, trustworthy former minister 
criticizing a church whose use was likely a fair one.126  Percentage of infringing 
uses was inapposite as a factor in RTC because there was only one potential 
infringing use identified.  Arguably, Netcom did demonstrate overt bad faith by 
failing to even look at postings upon receiving notice of potential infringement, in 
line with their investigative policies.127  Thus, because the two implicated factors 
cut in opposite directions regarding whether liability should be found,128 it is not 
surprising that the court held that the evidence presented a close question of fact as 
to whether Netcom knew or should have known that the minister had infringed 
plaintiff’s copyright.129 
                                                          
122 Id. at 1077 (stating that a phone call from AOL subscriber to AOL, “should have put AOL on 
notice of infringing activity on the particular USENET group at issue in this case, ‘alt.binaries.e-book.’  
[The caller] contacted AOL to report the existence of unauthorized copies of works by various 
authors.”).  
123 Id. at 1075 (“The USENET news-group at issue in this case was used primarily to exchange 
unauthorized digital copies of works by famous authors, including Ellison.”) (emphasis added). 
124 Id. at 1077.  AOL waited approximately six months before registering the change of its contact 
e-mail address with the U.S. Copyright Office, and did not configure the old e-mail address so that it 
would forward messages to the new address or return new messages to their senders, so complaints sent 
during that time period went unheeded, without those complainants being notified that their messages 
had not been delivered.  Id. at 1077. 
125 Religious Tech. Ctr. (RTC) v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1383 
(N.D. Cal. 1995). “[T]here is little evidence that Netcom . . . knew or should have known that Erlich 
was engaged in copyright infringement of plaintiffs’ works and was not entitled to a fair use defense . . . 
.”  Id. at 1374. 
126 Id. at 1374–75 (“Given the context of a dispute between a former minister and a church he is 
criticizing, [online service provider] may be able to show that its lack of knowledge that [the online 
post] was infringing was reasonable.”). 
127 Id. at 1374–75 (“Netcom admits that it did not even look at the postings once given notice and 
that had it looked at the copyright notice and statements regarding authorship, it would have triggered 
an investigation into whether there was infringement.”).   
128 A non-dubious user cuts in favor of finding no liability, and potential acts of overt bad faith cut 
in favor of a finding of liability.  
129 Id. at 1374. 
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e.  Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982) 
In Inwood, the court held that a drug manufacturer was not contributorily 
liable for creating a generic pill similar in appearance to a trademarked drug, which 
pharmacists subsequently mislabeled, because the trademark holder had not shown 
that the manufacturer intentionally induced the pharmacists to mislabel generic 
drugs or continued to supply the drug to pharmacists who the manufacturer knew 
or should have known were mislabeling generic drugs.130  Pharmacists are not 
generally viewed as dubious or untrustworthy users who are seeking to infringe; in 
fact the district court found that “to the extent mislabeling had occurred . . . it 
resulted from pharmacists’ misunderstanding of the requirements of the New York 
Drug Substitution Law, rather than from deliberate attempts” to infringe,131 or 
profit from substitution.132  Furthermore, the district court found that incidents of 
infringement were infrequent, and thus the percentage of infringing uses was 
low.133  Finally, the court found no overt evidence of bad faith, as the 
manufacturer’s behavior reflected normal industry practice,134 and use of the same 
color for brand names and their generic equivalents had a functional purpose.135  
The absence of the three key factors is consistent with a finding of no liability. 
f.  Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (citations omitted), aff’d, Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1999)   
In Lockheed, the court found that an online service provider, NSI, was not 
liable for accepting registrations of domain names similar to Lockheed’s trademark 
and refusing to cancel them in response to Lockheed’s demands.136  Though the 
case was affirmed by the appellate court on other grounds, the district court held 
that NSI lacked knowledge of infringement of Lockheed’s mark.137  In Lockheed, a 
massive number of varied users were registering domain names with NSI, and thus 
                                                          
130 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854–55 (1982).  
131 Id. at 853. 
132 Id. at 856 n.16.   
133 Id. at 852–53.   
[The] trial court . . . considered evidence of actual instances of mislabeling by 
pharmacists, since frequent improper substitutions of a generic drug for [a brand 
name drug] could provide circumstantial evidence that the petitioners, merely by 
making available imitative drugs in conjunction with comparative price 
advertising, implicitly had suggested that pharmacists substitute improperly.   
After reviewing the evidence of incidents of mislabeling, the district court 
concluded that such incidents occurred too infrequently to justify the inference 
that petitioners’ catalogs and use of imitative colors had ‘impliedly invited’ 
druggists to mislabel.   
Id. at 852–53 (emphases added).  “[O]nly a ‘few instances,’ rather than a substantial number, of 
mislabelings occurred.”  Id. at 857 n.17.   
134 “The marketing methods used by Ives reflect normal industry practice.”  Id. at 847.   
135 Id. at 853, 857 n.20 (“[O]ffer[ing] a legitimate reason for producing an imitative product.”). 
136 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
137 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 967 (C.D. Cal. 1997) 
(“[E]vidence does not show that NSI . . .  knew or had reason to know that its services were being used 
to infringe Lockheed’s service mark.”). 
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the product was not specifically attractive to dubious users.138  Because of the 
large number of users, and the difficulty in determining when use of a trademark is 
in fact infringing,139 the percentage of infringing uses was not calculable.140  
Finally, NSI did not demonstrate overt bad faith or a disregard for the law, and in 
fact implemented reasonable notice procedures with which Lockheed failed to 
comply.141  The absence of the three key factors is consistent with a finding of no 
liability. 
g.  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
In Napster, the court found a peer-to-peer software (P2P) provider, Napster, 
liable based on actual and constructive knowledge.142  Napster, from the outset, 
took clear affirmative actions to attract dubious users to its product, such as 
promoting the availability of infringing files,143 and continued to provide its 
unaltered services after discovering that its facilities were attractive to dubious 
users who wanted to download illegal music.144  Evidence indicated that an 
overriding percentage of uses of Napster, eighty-seven percent, were infringing.145  
Finally, Napster demonstrated overt bad faith with Napster executives displaying 
open disregard for the law by downloading copyrighted songs,146 articulating the 
                                                          
138 “At the time of argument on this appeal, NSI was receiving approximately 130,000 registrations 
per month, although evidence indicates that the number of monthly registrations has been increasing 
steadily and is possibly much larger today.”  Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 982. 
139 Lockheed, 985 F. Supp at 951, 966 (noting “the inherent uncertainty in defining the scope of 
intellectual property rights in a trademark,” and the subsequent “uncertainty inherent in any 
determination that use of a domain name is infringing”).   
140 Id. at 967 (The court found that “knowledge of infringement [could not] be imputed to NSI 
because of the inherent uncertainty of trademark protection in domain names.”).   
141 Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 982–83.  
NSI [] maintain[s] a post-registration dispute-resolution procedure.  Anyone who 
feels that his or her rights are violated by the domain-name combination 
maintained by a registrant can submit a certified copy of a trademark registration 
to NSI.  NSI then requires the registrant to obtain a declaratory judgment of the 
right to maintain the domain-name combination.  If the registrant fails to do so, 
its registration is terminated. . . .  Lockheed sent two letters, on May 7 and June 
18, 1996 . . . NSI took no action on Lockheed’s requests, informing Lockheed by 
letter that Lockheed had failed to comply with the terms of NSI’s dispute 
resolution policy. 
Id.  
142 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
143 “Napster executives . . . have promoted the site with ‘screen shots listing infringing files.’”  Id. 
at 1020 n.5.    
144 Perfect 10, Inc., v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The software 
systems in Napster and Grokster were engineered, disseminated, and promoted explicitly for the 
purpose of facilitating piracy of copyrighted music and reducing legitimate sales of such music to that 
extent.  Most Napster and Grokster users understood this and primarily used those systems to purloin 
copyrighted music.”); Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013–14 (district court found that “evidence establishe[d] 
that a majority of Napster users use the service to download and upload copyrighted music”). 
145 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013 (“[T]he record supports the district court’s determination that ‘as 
much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted and more than 
seventy percent may be owned or administered by plaintiffs.’”).   
146 “Napster executives . . . downloaded copyrighted songs from the system . . . .”  Id. at 1020 n.5.     
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need to remain ignorant of infringers’ identities,147 and failing to fully remove 
specifically identified infringing content.148  The strong presence of the three key 
factors is thus consistent with a finding of liability. 
h.  MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 933 (2005) 
In Grokster, the Court found StreamCast and Grokster, two P2P providers, 
liable based on an inducement theory.149  StreamCast and Grokster took clear 
affirmative actions at the outset of distribution to attract dubious users to their 
product by gearing and promoting their product towards a known group of users 
seeking to infringe—Napster users.150  The Court noted explicit evidence 
manifesting StreamCast and Grokster’s intent to attract and recruit dubious Napster 
users as their “initial target market.”151  Pursuant to StreamCast and Grokster’s 
behavior, an overriding percentage of the uses of their products were infringing.152  
Though the Court concluded that no one could say how often the software was 
used to obtain copies of unprotected material, “MGM’s evidence [that nearly 90% 
of the files available for download on the system were copyrighted works] gives 
reason to think that the vast majority of users’ downloads are acts of infringement, 
and . . . the probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering.”153 
Finally, StreamCast and Grokster displayed overt bad faith from the time 
when their products were first distributed by voicing illegal objectives, not merely 
                                                          
147 “[A] document authored by Napster co-founder Sean Parker mentioned ‘the need to remain 
ignorant of users’ real names and IP addresses ‘since they are exchanging pirated music . . . .’” Id. at 
1020 n.5.    
148 The RIAA “informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files, some of which are still 
available.”  Id. at 1020 n.5.  “Although Napster, Inc. purportedly terminated the users offering these 
files, the songs are still available using the Napster service.”  Id. at 1022 n.6. 
149 Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
150 Id. at 924.  It was well-known that Napster users were “dubious” because Napster was then 
under attack in the courts for facilitating massive infringement, and thus, it was clear that Napster users 
were “of a mind to infringe.”  Id. at 926, 937.   
[I]nternal communication indicates [Grokster] aimed to have a larger number of 
copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file-sharing networks.  
The point, of course, would be to attract users of a mind to infringe, just as it 
would be with promotional materials developed showing copyrighted songs as 
example of the kinds of files available. . . . 
Id. at 925–26 (emphasis added). 
151 Namely: (1) Streamcast and Grokster gave away programs compatible with Napster (and hence 
desirable to Napster users), and then promoted their own interface to the individuals who showed 
interested in the Napster-compatible programs, in an effort to “leverage Napster’s 50 million user base;” 
(2) Internal company documents and e-mails verbalized the goal to attract large numbers of former 
Napster users if Napster was shut down (by court order or otherwise), and to have a larger number of 
copyrighted songs available on their networks than other file sharing networks; and (3) Messages to 
advertisers and potential advertisers, broadcast banner advertisements to users of other Napster-
compatible software, and promotional materials all espoused the view that Grokster and StreamCast 
“planned to be the next Napster.”  Id. at 924–25 (internal quotation marks omitted); Perfect 10, Inc., v. 
Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 801 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Further, the Grokster operators explicitly 
targeted the then-current users of the Napster program by sending them ads for its OpenNap 
Program.”).   
152 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 922–23 
153 Id.  In fact, the court stated that “[t]he argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is . . . 
a powerful one, given the number of infringing downloads that occur every day.”  Id. at 929. 
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after massive infringement occurred.154  In addition to displaying overt bad faith 
upon initial distribution of their products, StreamCast and Grokster displayed 
further overt bad faith after it became apparent that their products were primarily 
being used by infringing users, such as rejecting another company’s offer to help 
monitor infringement, blocking IP addresses of entities it believed were trying to 
engage in such monitoring, and answering e-mails about using illegal content.155  
Thus, because Grokster was a case where all three key factors were unmistakably 
present, it predictably resulted in a finding of liability.   
i.  Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417 (1984) 
In Sony, the Court found that Sony, a home video recorder (HVR) 
distributor, was not liable for contributory infringement based on a lack of imputed 
intent or knowledge.156  Though the Court made broad statements in dicta about 
when intent may or may not be imputed, the holding in Sony is clearly in line with 
other case law; all three key factors were lacking, pointing to a finding of no 
liability.  In Sony, the distributor took no affirmative actions to attract dubious 
users to its product at the outset (such as advertising infringing uses),157 and was 
never presented with information that its product was specifically attracting 
dubious purchasers seeking to use the HVRs to infringe.  Furthermore, the 
percentage of uses that were infringing was not overwhelming: “evidence showed 
that the principle use of the VCR was . . . to be a fair, not an infringing use.”158  
                                                          
154 The court explicitly noted that “[t]he record is replete with evidence that from the moment 
Grokster and StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective 
that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage 
infringement.”  Id. at 923–24 (emphasis added).  For example, “StreamCast [] planned to flaunt the 
illegal uses of its software; when it launched the OpenNap network, the chief technology officer of the 
company averred that ‘[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and get sued.  It’s the best way to get 
into the new[s].’”  Id. at 925. 
155 First, upon learning that the “substantive volume [of users’ demand was] a function of free 
access to copyrighted work,” the companies attempted to translate that demand into advertising dollars.  
Id. at 926.  Second, there was “no evidence that either company made an effort to filter copyrighted 
material from users’ downloads or otherwise impede the sharing of copyrighted files” even after 
receiving notice and acquiring knowledge of such infringement.  Id. at 923 (“[I]t is uncontested that 
[defendants] are aware that users employ their software primarily to download copyrighted files, even if 
the decentralized [] networks fail to reveal which files are being copied and when.”).  And after 
receiving notices, Grokster sent warning e-mails, but never blocked anyone from continuing to use its 
software to share copyrighted files, “rejected another company’s offer of help to monitor infringement, 
[and] blocked IP addresses of entities it believed were trying to engage in such monitoring on its 
networks.”  Id. at 926–27.  Also “neither company attempted to develop filtering tools.”  Id. at 939.  
And lastly, the companies responded with guidance to e-mails from users who had questions about 
using illegal content.  Id. at 923 (“[M]oreover, the companies have learned about their users’ 
infringement directly, as from users who have sent e-mail to each company with questions about 
playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded, to whom the companies have responded with 
guidance.”).   
156 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
157 “Although Sony’s advertisements urged consumers to buy the VCR to ‘record favorite shows’ 
or ‘build a library’ of recorded programs, neither of these uses was necessarily infringing.”  Grokster, 
545 U.S. at 931 (discussing Sony, 464 U.S. 417). 
158 Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 423–24); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 
651 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 421) (“Court [] thought it important to say the Betamax 
was used ‘principally’ for time shifting.”).  The Court remarked that in Sony, “the plaintiffs owned only 
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Finally, the distributor in Sony did not display overt bad faith or disregard of the 
law.  Thus, lacking these three factors, no actual or imputed intent could be 
proven,159 and the Court found that Sony was not contributorily liable.  
j.  In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) 
In In re Aimster, the court found Aimster, a P2P software provider, liable 
based on a willful blindness theory.160  Aimster and Madster took clear affirmative 
actions from the outset of distribution to attract dubious users to their product, 
gearing their one income-generating product towards users seeking infringing 
content.161  Furthermore, according to the evidence, uses of Aimster were almost 
entirely infringing or entirely infringing.162  Finally, Aimster demonstrated overt 
bad faith and disregard for the law by creating an encryption function in order to 
evade liability under case law163 and using infringing files in a tutorial on how to 
use Aimster software.164  Thus, because In re Aimster was a case where all three 
key factors were unmistakably present, it predictably resulted in a finding of 
liability. 
B.  The Continuation of Common Law Principles in the DMCA 
This article argues that despite the DMCA’s statutory origins, the DMCA is 
actually consistent with the three-factor paradigm of contributory infringement 
from the common law.  “Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to comply with 
international copyright treaties and to update domestic copyright law for the online 
world.”165  Specifically, Congress enacted Title II of the DMCA, the Online 
                                                          
a small percentage of the total amount of copyrighted television programming and it was unclear how 
many of the other owners objected to home taping.”  Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 443). 
159 “On th[e] facts [of Sony, there was] no evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote 
infringing uses.”  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 439).   
160 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643. 
161 Club Aimster, the means by which Aimster is financed, enables paying members to download 
with a single click the music most often shared by Aimster users, which is copyrighted.  Id. at 651–52 
(“Club Aimster lists only the 40 songs that are currently the most popular among its members; 
invariably these are under copyright.”).  It could also be argued that Aimster and Madster promoted 
their product towards a known group of users seeking to infringe—Napster users, with the names, 
Aimster and Madster made to sound like a spin off on “Napster.”  Id. at 645. 
162 Id. at 649, 653 (holding Aimster liable for “fail[ing] to produce any evidence that its service has 
ever been used for a noninfringing use, let alone evidence concerning the frequency of such uses”).  
“[W]hen a supplier is offering a product or service that has non-infringing as well as infringing uses, 
some estimate of the respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of contributory 
infringement.”  Id. at 649.  
163 Id. at 650 (holding that defendant could not use encryption software “to prevent himself from 
learning what surely he strongly suspects to be the case: that the users of his service–maybe all the 
users of his service–are copyright infringers”).  “Aimster failed to . . . present evidence that the 
provision of an encryption capability effective against the service provider itself added important value 
to the service or saved significant cost.  Aimster blinded itself in the hope that by doing so it might 
come within the rule of the Sony decision.”  Id. at 653.  
164 Id. at 651 (“In explaining how to use the Aimster software, the tutorial gives as its only 
examples of file sharing the sharing of [notice given] copyrighted music . . . .  The tutorial is [an] 
invitation to infringement.”). 
165 Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 
112 Stat. 2860 (1998); 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.02[A]  (2003); DAVID W. QUINTO, LAW OF 
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Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), to facilitate 
cooperation among internet service providers and copyright owners “to detect and 
deal with copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked 
environment.”166  Through this statute, Congress attempted “to provide ‘greater 
certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements 
that [might] occur in the course of their activities.’”167 
The DMCA did not rewrite or attempt to clarify copyright law for the online 
world.168  Rather, Congress opted to leave current law and instead create a series 
of safe harbors, to limit service provider’s liability for claims of copyright 
infringement when a “provider is found to be liable under existing principles of 
law.”169  Thus, a claim against a service provider for contributory copyright 
infringement is evaluated just as it would be in the non-online context; only after it 
is determined whether common law liability exists, does the court make an 
evaluation as to whether a DMCA safe harbor applies, absolving liability.170   
1.  Provisions Under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)   
“To be eligible for any of the four safe harbor limitations of liability, a 
service provider must meet the conditions for eligibility set forth in OCILLA.”171  
Namely, the safe harbors only apply to a service provider who meets certain 
threshold requirements, including that the service provider: 
(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account 
holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for 
the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of 
the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers; and  
(B) accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures.172 
Courts have interpreted DMCA § 512(i)(A) to contain a three prong requirement: a 
service provider must “(1) adopt a policy that provides for the termination of 
service access for repeat copyright infringers in appropriate circumstances; (2) 
implement that policy in a reasonable manner; and (3) inform its subscribers of the 
policy.”173  A service provider “implements” a policy if it (a) has a working 
notification system, (b) has a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant 
notifications, and (c) does not actively prevent copyright owners from collecting 
                                                          
INTERNET DISPUTES § 6.02 (2002)). 
166 Id. (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 512 (West 2003) and quoting S. REP. NO. 104–190, at 20 (1998); H.R. 
REP. NO. 105–551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998)).   
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 1077.   
169 Id. at 1076–77 (quoting S. REP. NO 105–109, at 19) (citing 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 512(a)–(d) (West 
2003)).   
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 1080 (citation omitted).   
172 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i) (West 2003).   
173 Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1080 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(i) (West 2003)).   
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information needed to issue such notifications.174  Implementation is “reasonable” 
if, under “appropriate circumstances,” the service provider terminates users who 
repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.175 
2.  Provisions Under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)   
Section 512(c) of the DMCA “limits the liability of qualifying service 
providers for claims of direct, vicarious, and contributory infringement for storage 
at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled 
or operated by or for the service provider.”176  Under § 512(c)(1), a service 
provider qualifies for safe harbor if it meets the requirements of § 512(i) and: 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or 
disable access to, the material; 
(B) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed 
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.177   
Under the § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) “red flag” doctrine, “a service provider may 
lose immunity if it fails to take action with regard to infringing material when it is 
‘aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.’  
Notice that fails to substantially comply with § 512(c)(3), however, cannot be 
deemed to impart such awareness.”178   
3.  Identifying the Three Factors in the DMCA 
According to the legislative history of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512 requisites 
that must be met in order for a service provider to be afforded a safe harbor are 
separate and independent from the contributory infringement requirements, and 
shift the burden to the copyright owner.179  However, in reality, the same three key 
factors (attraction of dubious users, percentage of infringing uses, and bad faith) 
                                                          
174 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Ellison, 357 F.3d at 
1080). 
175 Id. at 1109–10 (citing Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (W.D. 
Wa. 2004)).   
176 Id. at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
177 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(c) (West 2003).   
178 CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1114 (quoting § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii)) (citing §§ 512(c)(3)(B)(i) & (ii)) (holding 
that names of websites containing words such as “illegal” or “stolen” or fact that website was used for 
“password-hacking” were insufficient to constitute red-flags of infringement). 
179 See id. at 1113 (“The DMCA notification procedures place the burden of policing copyright 
infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately documenting 
infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.”). 
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that arise in the context of common law contributory liability are implicated in the 
determination of eligibility for a safe harbor.   
A § 512(i) repeat infringer policy that is reasonably implemented facilitates 
the identification and termination of acknowledged infringers.  An online service 
with a functioning and enforced repeat infringer policy is unlikely to attract 
“dubious users” seeking a forum conducive to infringement.  It is similarly 
unlikely that an online service provider with such a policy will find itself 
overwhelmingly used for infringing purposes.  Furthermore, the continuous effort 
required to maintain and reasonably implement a viable repeat infringer policy 
demonstrates regard for the law, and a lack of bad faith.180  Conversely, a failure to 
maintain and reasonably implement a repeat infringer policy, demonstrating bad 
faith and disregard for the law, causes the online service provider to lose the 
protection of the DMCA safe harbors.181  
Section 512(c) is similarly consistent with the body of common law and 
principles behind it.  Section 512(c) provides that if a service provider lacks 
statutorily compliant notice, and has no other means of actual knowledge or “red 
flags” (constructive knowledge) of infringement, and meets all other DMCA 
requirements, then he is protected by the DMCA safe harbors.  The actual and 
constructive knowledge portions of § 512(c) mirror the actual and constructive 
knowledge requirements in common law.  As for the requirement of statutorily 
compliant notice, and disqualification of notices that are not statutorily compliant 
for the purposes of imparting knowledge,182 under common law, courts have 
refused to hold distributors liable if the distributor put into place a reporting policy 
and notice was not compliant with that policy.183  Similarly, the § 512(c)(iii) 
provision provides a safe harbor to online service providers who act expeditiously 
                                                          
180 See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1110 (finding that CCBill reasonably implemented a repeat infringer 
policy when it made a good faith effort to record; record did not reflect a failure “to record webmasters 
associated with allegedly infringing websites,” where the e-mail address and/or name of most 
webmasters were routinely recorded in a log and chart). 
181 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding Aimster liable for 
attempting to evade the law under Sony, finding that Aimster did not reasonably implement its stated 
repeat infringer policy because the encryption on Aimster rendered it impossible to ascertain which 
users were transferring which files; “far from doing anything to discourage repeat infringers of the 
plaintiff’s copyrights, Aimster invited them to do so, showed them how they could do so with ease 
using its system, and by teaching its users how to encrypt their unlawful distribution of copyrighted 
materials disabled itself from doing anything to prevent infringement”). 
182 See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1114.   
183 See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 982–83 (9th Cir. 
1999) (refusing to hold NSI liable for contributory infringement despite letters from Lockheed claiming 
that two registrations were infringing its trademark, because NSI maintained a reasonable dispute 
resolution procedure with which Lockheed failed to comply).  
NSI [] maintain[s] a post-registration dispute-resolution procedure.  Anyone who 
feels that his or her rights are violated by the domain-name combination 
maintained by a registrant can submit a certified copy of a trademark registration 
to NSI.  NSI then requires the registrant to obtain a declaratory judgment of the 
right to maintain the domain-name combination.  If the registrant fails to do so, 
its registration is terminated. . . .  Lockheed sent two letters, on May 7 and June 
18, 1996 . . . NSI took no action on Lockheed’s requests, informing Lockheed by 
letter that Lockheed had failed to comply with the terms of NSI’s dispute 
resolution policy. 
Id.  
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to remove or disable access to infringing material upon obtaining knowledge or 
awareness of it, comports with the “bad faith” inquiry performed by courts under 
the common copyright law and parallel trademark law;184 when a distributor 
demonstrates willingness to cooperate with the law, courts have consistently been 
reluctant to impose liability.185   
Thus, although the DMCA is legislative in origin, it implicates the same 
factors and policies underlying the common law.  If a distributor gears his product 
towards dubious users, the overriding percentage of uses of his service are 
infringing, and he displays a bad faith attitude towards compliance of the law.  
Accordingly, it is highly unlikely that the distributor will be sheltered by the 
DMCA safe harbors from liability.   
4.  The Policy Goals Behind Limiting Constructive Knowledge Upheld 
Through the DMCA   
In their dicta limiting the constructive knowledge doctrine, courts aimed to 
protect “defendant[s] [who] merely sell[] a commercial product suitable for some 
lawful use,” but subsequently the product is overwhelmingly used by infringers.186  
Courts have been reluctant to impose liability on such a defendant because such 
infringing uses were not his initial intent, and courts did not want to discourage 
prospective innovators from offering new products and services, chilling 
commercial growth.187  The DMCA’s safe harbor provisions protect such 
defendants who, upon becoming aware of infringing uses, implement a reasonable 
policy to terminate repeat infringers.188  Thus, per the DMCA, even if intent is 
imputed from knowledge that a service is being overwhelmingly used for 
infringing uses, the defendant is only liable if he continues to provide services and 
takes no steps to prevent infringement using his service or product.  
                                                          
184 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that eBay was not 
liable for contributory infringement because “to the extent the [notices] that Tiffany submitted gave 
eBay reason to know that particular listings were for counterfeit goods, eBay did not continue to carry 
those listings once it learned that they were specious . . . eBay’s practice was promptly to remove the 
challenged listing from its website . . . .”).     
185 But see Metro-Goldwyn-Meyers (MGM) Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 1022 n.6 
(2005)  (holding Napster liable for not removing identified infringing content in a timely manner; 
“although Napster, Inc. purportedly terminated the users offering these files, the songs are still available 
using the Napster service”). 
186 Id. at 936.   
187 Viacom, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[W]ithout 
clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate to make the necessary investment in the 
expansion of the speed and capacity of the internet.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 714 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ellison v. 
Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)) (“Congress enacted title II of the DMCA ‘to provide 
greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur 
in the course of their activities.’”).   
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IV.  A LOOK AT TWO RECENT 2010 CASES IN LIGHT OF THE THREE FACTORS 
A.  A Recent Contributory Trademark Infringement Case: Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. 
eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) 
In Tiffany v. eBay, the court found that eBay was not contributorily liable for 
infringement of Tiffany products being sold on its website.189  This “no liability” 
ruling is consistent with the previous body of case law when assessed in light of 
the three previously identified factors.  First, eBay attracts a massive number of 
varied sellers, and thus, the eBay service is not specifically attractive to dubious 
users.190  Furthermore, within the subgroup of “Tiffany sellers,” it is difficult to 
distinguish between trustworthy users selling second-hand Tiffany goods from 
dubious users selling counterfeit Tiffany’s goods.191  Secondly, even within the 
subgroup of “Tiffany sellers,” the district court found that the percentage of uses 
that were infringing, though significant, were not overriding.192  Finally, eBay did 
not display overt bad faith or disregard of the law.  To the contrary, the district 
court found that eBay acted in “good faith,” established and implemented 
reasonable rules and procedures against infringers, and spent a significant amount 
of money, resources, and time screening for infringers generally—and Tiffany 
infringers specifically.193  Thus, because Tiffany was a case where all three key 
factors were conspicuously absent, it predictably resulted in a finding of “no 
liability.” 
                                                          
189 Tiffany, 600 F.3d 93. 
190 Id. at 97 (“eBay has been enormously successful.  More than six million new listings are posted 
on its site daily.  At any given time it contains some 100 million listings.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
191 See id. at 97–98 (“[Tiffany] does not—nor can it, for that matter—control the legitimate 
secondary market in authentic Tiffany silver jewelry.  Even had [eBay] been able to inspect the goods, 
moreover, in many instances it likely would not have had the expertise to determine whether they were 
counterfeit.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
192 Though evidence based on surveys performed by Tiffany found 73.1% of the purported Tiffany 
goods purchased in 2004 and 75.5% of the goods purchased in 2005 were counterfeit, the district court 
discounted this evidence because the surveys were “methodologically flawed and [hence] of 
questionable value,” and “provided limited evidence as to the total percentage of counterfeit goods 
available on eBay at any time.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Instead, the court found that although “a 
significant portion of the Tiffany sterling silver jewelry listed on the eBay website . . . was counterfeit,” 
and that “eBay knew that some portion of the Tiffany goods sold on its website might be counterfeit . . .  
however, [] a substantial number of authentic Tiffany goods are [also] sold on eBay.”  Id. at 98.   
193 “eBay spends as much as $20 million each year on tools to promote trust and safety on its 
website,” and implemented a “fraud engine” computer program principally dedicated to finding “illegal 
listings,” with “Tiffany-specific filters,” and a notice and takedown system, removing reported listing 
within twenty-four hours of receiving a notice form.  Id. at 98–99.  “eBay never refused to remove a 
reported Tiffany listing, acted in good faith in responding to Tiffany’s notices, and always provided 
Tiffany with the seller’s contact information.”  Id. at 99.  eBay implemented “special warning messages 
when a seller attempted to list a Tiffany item,” cancelled particular suspicious transactions, employed a 
“three strikes rule” for suspending vendors, and delayed the ability of buyers to view listings of certain 
brand names, including Tiffany’s, to give rights holders, such as Tiffany, more time to review those 
listings.  Id. at 99–100.   
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B.  A Recent Contributory Trademark Infringement Case: Viacom 
International Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
In Viacom v. YouTube, the court found that YouTube was not contributorily 
liable for the infringement of Viacom’s works reproduced on its website.  This “no 
liability” ruling is consistent with the previous body of case law, when assessed in 
light of the three previously identified factors.  First, unlike the P2P cases, 
YouTube attracts a massive number of varied uploading users, and thus, the 
YouTube service is not specifically attractive to dubious users.194  Secondly, the 
district court found that the percentage of uses that were infringing could not even 
be established.195  Finally, YouTube did not display overt bad faith or disregard of 
the law; to the contrary, YouTube has a designated agent who swiftly removes 
infringing content in response to DMCA notices.196  Thus, despite dicta stating 
that the application of Grokster “to the particular subset of service providers 
protected by the DMCA is strained,” a consistent thread runs between the results of 
the common law copyright cases and the DMCA cases.  Because YouTube was a 
case where all three key factors were conspicuously absent, it predictably resulted 
in a finding of “no liability.” 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the often contradictory dicta in contributory trademark and 
copyright cases, especially as applied in the online context, it is easy to conclude 
that this is an area of law where standards are constantly shifting.  However, a 
closer look reveals consistent results both within the bodies of contributory 
copyright infringement cases and contributory trademark infringement cases, 
respectively, as well as underlying commonalities between the two doctrines.  The 
same three factors consistently predict liability under both doctrines, carrying 
through in the DMCA context as well.   
 
                                                          
194 Despite Viacom’s contentions that YouTube “welcomed [the posting of] copyright—infringing 
material . . . on their website” because “[s]uch material was attractive to users, whose increased usage 
enhanced defendant’s income from advertising,” it is not clear that the site specifically attracts dubious 
users or that the majority of uses of the site are infringing.  Viacom, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 
2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).  “Presently, over 24 hours of new video-viewing time is uploaded to the 
YouTube website every minute.”  Id. 
195 “[T]he infringing works in suit may be only a small fraction of millions of works posted by 
others on the service’s platform.”  Id. at 524. 
196 Compare, id. at 519 (“[YouTube] designated an agent, and when they received specific notice 
that a particular item infringed a copyright, they swiftly removed it.  It is uncontroverted that all clips in 
suit are off the YouTube website . . . .”) with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 
n.5, 1022 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating the RIAA “informed Napster of more than 12,000 infringing files, 
some of which are still available . . . .  Although Napster, Inc. purportedly terminated the users offering 
these files, the songs are still available using the Napster service”). 
